



Concepts of War: East vs. West



Col Chet Richards, USAFR
October 1995



**The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao.**

**The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.**



The Standard Model

The superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of combat ... the direct result of this is that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point — Clausewitz, Book III, Ch, VIII

Evidence for the Standard Model

- ▶ Basic research aimed at understanding the fundamentals of combat is needed, but quantitative numerical techniques have not been systematically applied to achieve these discoveries — GAO
- ▶ The entire system—and each ring—has within it key centers of gravity — Col John Warden's concept of *parallel war*

Essence of The Standard Model: Structure vs. Structure

Each of the sides in a conflict forms a *system*.

- ✓ Range of enemy alternatives can be bounded
- ✓ Effects of enemy actions are predictable

Corollary #1: Conflict can be modeled.

Corollary #2: What decides in the model
decides on the ground.


Apply the standard model to the following:

European Scenario (non-nuclear):

1. The two sides are roughly equal: 140 divisions, 1,500 aircraft, 4,000 tanks
2. Side A has more heavy artillery
3. Both sides are fully mobilized
4. Both sides know that political & terrain considerations will force the battle into a pre-defined 200-mile gap
5. Side A will play defense, Clausewitz's 'superior form of combat (i.e., ties go to Side A)


Assignment: Assess the results after 30 days.

What really happened



**The Germans
(Side B) reached
the Channel in 10
days.**


It was no fluke



Arabs vs. Persia, Byzantine Empire	633 - 732
Mongols vs. China, Russia, etc.	1211 - 1260
American Colonies vs. Great Britain	1775 - 1781
Germany vs. France, England, Belgium, Holland	1940
Israel vs. Arab States	1947 - 1973
Algeria vs. France	1954 - 1961
Vietnam vs. United States	1958 - 1975
Afghanistan vs. USSR	1980 - 1988
Chad vs. Libya	1987


First Orientation

We have been led astray by
computerized wargames ...
because the primary determinant
of victory in these exercises is a
preponderance of firepower—
Gen. James H. Polk, USA



Second Orientation

But Ked-Buka was a Mongol general and he was not impressed by numbers — James Chambers, *The Devil's Horsemen*




Third Orientation

According to my assessment, even if you have many more troops than others, how can that help you win?

Sun Tzu


What are models missing?



Strategy: Working Definition

Strategy is concerned with getting another group of people to do what we want them to do, e.g.


- *Deny them the opportunity to achieve their goals, or*
- *Deny them the ability to survive on their own terms, or*
- *Deny them the right to survive at all,*



while they are, simultaneously, trying to enforce this same program on us.

Strategy from models

Lanchester: Attrition is a (predictable)
function of force ratios: $\Delta F_r = -kF_b$



Idea:

At some point, Red gives up and submits
to the will of Blue


Conditions for the standard model

1. Both sides have to agree
2. One side has to be mathematically illiterate

Question: Why does the losing side keep playing the game?

The standard model after Saddam

What leader anywhere in the world would be foolish enough to test us in the air ... ?



Our failure has been when there's no platform to engage — Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, USMC

Ways not to play the standard game

1. Disguise, diversify, and demassify the system
2. Acquire weapons of mass destruction on mobile systems
3. Where immobile, be invisible (practice *ninjitsu*)
4. When attacked, mutate (& choose an asymmetrical and unpredictable response)
5. Attack information (esp. in the prewar phase)


Col Richard Szfranski, USAF,
Chair of National Military Strategy,
Air War College

Fundamental limits to systems

Second Law of
Thermodynamics

Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle

Gödel's Theorem



Foundation of a different model

*The paradox of ambiguity was an exact science in the Taoist literature of higher psychology**

Subtlety

Agility

Preparation of the
opponent

Focus on the moral
dimension



*Thomas Cleary

Col C. Richards

The Mysterious East

Skilled warriors of old were subtle,
Mysteriously powerful,
So deep they were
unknowable —
Tao Te Ching



Subtlety

Be extremely subtle, even to the point of formlessness — Sun Tzu


"The Book of No-Thing-ness"
(Chapter 5 of Musashi's *Book of Five Rings*)

Thus the inscrutable win,
the obvious lose — Du Mu




Formlessness is not merely concealment, deception, etc.

Therefore the consummation of forming an army is
to arrive at formlessness. When you have no form,
undercover espionage
cannot find out anything,
intelligence cannot form
a strategy — Sun Tzu




Can you be formless and effective?

Military formation is like
water...the form of a
military force is to
avoid the full
and attack the
empty
—Sun Tzu




Anything that
takes shape can
be countered —*The Masters of
Huainan*



Agility

The ability to gain victory by changing and adapting to circumstances is called genius —
Sun Tzu



By constantly creating difficulties for the enemy, you will force him to deal with more than one thing, giving you the advantage in killing him quickly — Musashi

Mental Agility


Strategy is a system of ad hoc expedients
— von Moltke (the Elder)

If your mind stops on the sword your
opponent is swinging at you, a gap opens
up, and in that gap, your action falters —
Zen Master Takuan

Rommel believed that in the consequent
unpredictable fighting, his own swiftness
of action and the training of his troops
would bring victory — Douglas Fraser,
Knight's Cross

Quickness

The condition of a military force is that its essential factor is quickness, taking advantage of others' failure to catch up, going by routes they do not expect, attacking where they are not on guard.



Sun Tzu

Time


With a time advantage, numbers don't count — Gen James H. Polk

One action has grown out of another with such rapidity that there has never been a time when men could quietly plot against him — Machiavelli on Ferdinand of Aragon

Strategy is based on quickness, not speed. ... In combat, you are not in a contest of strength and you are not in a race — Musashi

First Synthesis

Ancient strategists, and a few modern ones, saw that somehow, a concept like agility/quickness could produce formlessness



Preparing the opponent


Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first, then seek to win — Zhang Yu

It is essential that you control the enemy and make slaying him a simple thing to do ... There is nothing wrong with escaping from combat if you honestly cannot win the fight — Musashi

One way to prepare your opponents

The unorthodox (*ch'i*) and the orthodox (*cheng*) give rise to each other like a beginningless circle—who could exhaust them?

Sun Tzu



Nothing is not orthodox, nothing is not unorthodox. Victory without both amounts to a lucky win in a brawl.

Ho Yanxi

Meet Miyamoto Musashi

- Considered Japan's greatest swordsman
- Victor of 60 sword fights
- Wrote *The Book of Five Rings* (1645)
- Also, master of calligraphy, art, etc.



Second synthesis: The Musashi Inequality

Note that $(0.9885)^{60} < .50$

Moral dimension of combat

Recognized by Clausewitz as permeating "the whole being of war" and usually of greater influence than the purely physical. (Book III, Ch. III)

Clausewitz defined three "chief moral virtues:"

- ✓ The talents of the commander
- ✓ The military virtue of the army
- ✓ Its national feeling

Other ideas on moral forces

Ibn Khaldun (the first modern historian) concluded that the side with the stronger group feeling usually wins.

The Tao of military operations lies in harmonizing people. When people are in harmony, they will fight on their own initiative, without exhortation — Zhuge Liang

Generally one may consider the spirit of the opponent as the point of concentration — Musashi

Effect of moral warfare (an example)

Lacking victories over their competitors, and unable to defend themselves from their bosses, they lash out at each other, making unity of purpose even harder to achieve — quality guru Joseph Juran



Waging moral warfare

Idea: A la Musashi, defeat the opponents' spirit first, before risking a decision in cold steel.

Practicing martial arts, assess your opponents; cause them to lose spirit and direction so that even if the opposing army is intact it is useless—this is winning by the Tao.

Zhang Yu

The best policy is to use strategy, influence, and the trend of events to cause the adversary to submit willingly—Ho Yanxi

But if you still have to fight



Toolkit for Moral Warfare (Tactical/ Strategic Levels):

- ✓ Ferocity
- ✓ Surprise
- ✓ Deception
- ✓ Ambiguity
- ✓ Agitprop, lies, etc.
- ✓ Sow jealousy, dissent, etc.

And then there's *timing and rhythm*.

Rhythm

There are times during a conflict when the rhythm of the opponent goes haywire and he begins to collapse.

The opponent collapses when his time comes and his rhythm is broken.

You use an advantageous rhythm to arrest the powerful determination of the adversary's motivation.

—*Musashí*

Moral Effect of Time: The Blitzkrieg

It was the time factor that surprised and defeated the French ... On 19 May, Guderian's 1.Pz.Div crossed the Somme near Peronne. Many French senior officers had arrived in Peronne to find out what was happening. They were captured — Len Deighton, *Blitzkrieg*

A modern view of rhythm

Observe, Orient, Decide and Act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity ...

Permits one to:

Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse


John Boyd

3rd synthesis: Moral effects of timing and rhythm

Ancient strategists , and a few modern ones,
also saw that by using timing and rhythm,
one could attack the all-important
moral forces that distinguish
an army from a mob.



Using the "Oriental Model"— One scheme



Final Thoughts

There is a whole world of strategy out there, dedicated to ideas like:

You can achieve your goals

You can control your
opponents

You don't *have* to do
things that are
really dumb

